The Role of Precontractual Signals in Creating Sustainable Global Supply Chains by Bird, Robert C. & Soundararajan, Vivek
 
 
The Role of Precontractual Signals in Creating
Sustainable Global Supply Chains




Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Bird, RC & Soundararajan, V 2018, 'The Role of Precontractual Signals in Creating Sustainable Global Supply
Chains', Journal of Business Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-4067-z
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-4067-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Role of Precontractual Signals in Creating Sustainable Global 
Supply Chains
Robert C. Bird1 · Vivek Soundararajan2
Received: 8 April 2018 / Accepted: 14 November 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
Global supply chains enhance value, but are subject to governance problems and encourage evasive practices that deter sus-
tainability, especially in developing countries. This article proposes that the precontractual environment, where parties are 
interested in trade but have not yet negotiated formal terms, can enable a unique process for building long-term sustainable 
relations. We argue that precontractual signals based on relation-specific investments, promises of repeated exchange, and 
reassuring cheap talk can be leveraged in precontract by the power of framing. We show how these framing signals are ampli-
fied in precontract because the lack of credible information, minimal time for reflection, and the role of risk-aversion present 
in supply chain contract negotiations. The result is a process that is uniquely productive for building long-term and value-
generating contractual relations in supply chains, particularly in skeptical or even hostile negotiating contexts. We then show 
how framed precontractual signals generate a joint contractual surplus through a supernormal profit known as a relational 
rent. This rent can be invested to improve sustainable practices, an efficient option in a competitive market due to the second 
order effects that sustainable practices generate. This novel process we propose thus potentially generates superior returns 
to other trust measures and encourages focus on precontract as a fertile environment for building sustainable investments.
Keywords Sustainability · Global supply chains · Precontract · Framing · Developing countries
Sustainability is an important component of multi-tier global 
supply chains (Levy et al. 2015).1 There is evidence that 
sustainable supply chains improve product quality (Van 
der Vorst et al. 2009), unlock new markets (Hassini et al. 
2012), increase consumer engagement (Linton et al. 2007), 
and deliver superior economic performance (Rao and Holt 
2005). Sustainability in global supply chains is also of press-
ing social importance, impacting the health, safety, human 
rights, and economic development of workers (Maloni and 
Brown 2006). Sustainable practices also influence important 
environmental challenges such as climate change, pollution, 
and hyper-exploitation of non-renewable resources (Linton 
et al. 2007). As a result, a growing literature has emerged 
in implementation of sustainability in supply chains (Van 
Bommel 2011).
Supply chain sustainability is increasingly understood 
as implicating issues of contractual governance (Lumineau 
and Henderson 2012; Lumineau and Malhotra 2011). Con-
tractual governance is defined as the formal means between 
buyer and seller by which they safeguard the exchange of 
goods or services (Olander et al. 2010). Contractual govern-
ance is based on transaction cost economics, which theo-
rizes that managers align inter-firm relationships to man-
age potential hazards in the exchange. Such alignment is 
obtained through agreements that establish outcomes for 
unexpected events and define remedies for breach (Poppo 
and Zenger 2002).
The allure of contractual governance is that when unex-
pected events occur agreements will be enforced as agreed 
or equivalent damages paid. However, firms in global supply 
chains increasingly conduct business in economies where 
institutions responsible for enforcing contracts are weak 
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1 We interpret the term ‘sustainability’ in a broad fashion. More than 
environmentally aware supply chain management, a supply chain is 
sustainable when it is managed by taking economic, social, environ-
mental, and related dimensions into account in decision-making.
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(Levitsky and Murillo 2009). India, Bangladesh, and simi-
lar nations that frequently host source providers for supply 
chains exemplify such environments (Trebilcock and Leng 
2006). Without these prerequisite economic and social 
institutions, contractual governance in supply chains can-
not effectively function through formal enforcement alone 
(Dixit 2009).
Exacerbating this problem is that firms in the global sup-
ply chain environment too often cannot assume the pres-
ence of extracontractual governance factors such as trust 
and relationships (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). Lead 
firms grant suppliers short-term spot contracts, view them 
as interchangeable, and express little concern for the indi-
vidual firms from which they source (Grimm et al. 2016).2 
Suppliers in turn perceive lead firms as fickle, demanding, 
and fixated on lowest price (Soundararajan et al. 2018). As 
a result, lead firms and suppliers may have little if any trust 
in one another.
While other works have examined the role of contract 
performance (Kalkanci et al. 2011), contract enforcement 
(Lin 2009), and contract remedies (Cafaggi 2013) within 
the supply chain context, the literature exploring the role of 
precontractual activity in building sustainable global supply 
chains is almost non-existent. A precontractual environment 
is the period when two or more parties have expressed initial 
interest in negotiating a contract but have not yet agreed 
on the entirety of the contract’s terms (Bebchuk and Ben-
Shahar 2001). Precontractual behavior is an essential part of 
contracting where emergent norms, bargaining power, and 
enforceable terms are cemented (Kostritsky 1997). Precon-
tractual conduct can impact contractual performance and 
the effectiveness of successive contracts between the parties 
(Kostritsky 1998). Although the limited evidence available 
on the impact of precontractural conduct on supply chain 
relations and performance is promising (Beer et al. 2017), 
there is more work that needs to be done to understand 
the impact of precontractual conduct on sustainable sup-
ply chains. We narrow this scholarly gap by developing a 
process of how precontractual signals by the lead firm and 
supplier can facilitate the development of sustainable global 
supply chains. We leverage the role of framing, the organiza-
tion and presentation of information to emphasize a current 
or desired state of existence (Soundararajan and Brammer 
2018; Giorgi and Weber 2015), as a signaling channel. We 
show that, unlike environments of contractual performance 
and remedy, framing is amplified in precontractual environ-
ments where trust perceptions remain fluid, anticipation of 
future returns is strong, and prior contractual experience 
with one another has yet to influence the emerging relation.
We begin by exploring the conflicting incentives of lead 
firms and suppliers that impede the development of sus-
tainable practices. We show how framed signals, including 
relation-specific investments, offers of repeated exchange 
and cheap talk, can help build trust and generate relational 
rents in the precontractual environment. We then show how 
framed signals are amplified in the unique conditions of 
the precontractual environment. Finally, we explain how 
relational rents arising from framed precontractual signals 
solidify contractual performance and encourage a mutual 
commitment to sustainable practices.
The Evasion Game Between Lead Firm 
and Supplier
In the competitive environment of global supply chains, cost 
becomes the dominant concern of lead firms (Choi and Hart-
ley 1996; Lambert et al. 1998). The lead firms, directly or 
through intermediaries, choose suppliers to complete their 
orders. Suppliers compete for business through the produc-
tion parameters set by the lead firms in the contracts. With 
suppliers plentiful and goods standardized, lead firms will 
frequently shift from one supplier to another based on the 
best price offered in the open market (Gereffi et al. 2005; 
Gereffi and Frederick 2010). Profit margins in these mar-
kets, especially in supply chains in the apparel and agri-
cultural industries, are narrow (Sridhar and Prashad 2006). 
Under these conditions, a spot market is created whereby 
anonymous and undifferentiated suppliers compete for the 
business of distant and indifferent lead firms. The result is 
an anonymously competitive price-driven equilibrium that 
delivers profitable but thin margins where sustainability 
would be of little concern.
Upsetting this cost-driven model is the recognition that 
environmental destruction, child labor, forced labor, or other 
improper working conditions are endemic to supply chains, 
with increasing calls for lead firms to adopt sustainable prac-
tices (McCarthy 2017; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Scherer 
et al. 2016). Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and 
grassroots organizations are aware of these problems facing 
supply chains, and demand that firms conform to regula-
tions and sustainability requirements (Mena and Waeger 
2014). They publicize stories of malfeasance through social 
media and the public press, which in turn creates a name-
and-shame effect on the lead firms who employ the non-
sustainable suppliers (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010).
Lead firms, typically the primary target of NGO advo-
cacy, find themselves under pressure to respond (Barrientos 
and Smith 2007). For example, a recent report by Global 
Labour Justice, an International NGO, exposed the sexual 
2 In this manuscript we use “suppliers” to mean suppliers that are at 
base of the supply chain or are otherwise distant in time, space, or 
intervening links from the lead firm.
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and physical abuses perpitrated on  women working in 
South Asian garment factories supplying brands like Gap 
and H&M. Media outlets like AlJazeera and The Guard-
ian discussed this report thus putting pressure on brands to 
respond. As a result, Gap responded to the report emphasiz-
ing the policies in place to monitor and penalize such prac-
tices (Hodal 2018). Similarly, when SOMO, a Netherland 
based NGO published a report on bonded labor in garment 
factories in South India (https ://www.somo.nl/captu red-by-
cotto n/), lead firms faced immense pressure from the media 
and other stakeholders to respond immediately. Unrespon-
sive brands were heavily criticized as a result (Bhalla 2015).
However, lead firms have limited ability to witness their 
suppliers’ day-to-day conduct and discover real conditions in 
the factories (Wilhelm et al. 2016). Even if such monitoring 
were possible, the cost of monitoring distant and anony-
mous suppliers would be quite costly and may be too high 
to achieve profitably over time (Locke et al. 2009). Inspec-
tions often fail to uncover problems (Gualandris et al. 2015). 
Lead firms also face geographic, cultural, linguistic and 
institutional barriers that further impede monitoring (Zhou 
et al. 2016). In addition, unlike product quality and quantity, 
sustainability practices cannot be readily detected through 
examination of the final product (Wilhelm et al. 2016).
With direct monitoring of sustainability difficult, lead 
firms turn to sustainability certifications and social audits 
as information proxies (Bartley 2007; Mena and Palazzo 
2012). Sustainability certifications allow lead firms to rely 
upon these certification entities that review the suppliers 
and affirm conformance to appropriate environmental and 
social practices (Locke et al. 2009). Such certifications con-
vey legitimacy to NGOs and consumers in a clear and eas-
ily identifiable message (Soundararajan and Brown 2016). 
Given their relatively low cost and ease of publication, 
sustainability certifications are widely used across multiple 
industries in supply chains (Levy et al. 2015).
Suppliers, however, do not have the same incentives as 
lead firms to support sustainable practices. Suppliers, and 
particularly low tier suppliers, are relatively poor (Saini and 
Budhwar 2008). Sustainability standards can impose sub-
stantial financial pressure and threaten their ability to sur-
vive (Awaysheh and Klassen 2010; Khan and Lund-Thomsen 
2011). Furthermore, suppliers can be only weakly impacted 
by, and thus have limited identification with, the pressure 
on the lead firm or the drive for sustainability standards. 
Sustainability messages are often viewed by suppliers as 
empty statements for public consumption (Soundararajan 
et al. 2018). Lead firms can be unpredictable in their supplier 
choices, continually changing their suppliers according to 
shifting demands (Soundararajan et al. 2018; Blyde 2014). 
Lead firm buyers can rescind contracts in volatile markets 
and unexpectedly contest contract terms such as quality 
and price (Tampe 2018). As a result, suppliers have little 
motivation to invest in sustainable standards for the benefit 
of precarious partnership (Locke et al. 2009).
As a result of these incentives, suppliers seek out the least 
cost solution by evading sustainable practices through brib-
ery or deceit. Adept at gaming the system, suppliers can 
bribe the authorities tasked with auditing the enterprise, 
structure the firm’s operations so that they appear tempo-
rarily compliant when the audit occurs, or falsify written 
information that is transmitted to the certifying authority 
(Soundararajan et al. 2018). Suppliers can also display a 
‘show factory’ for outsiders while operating their remaining 
facilities in unsustainable conditions. The result is that sup-
pliers are incentivized to pursue only symbolic compliance 
(Huq et al. 2016; Lin 2009).
The result is an environment where governance of sus-
tainability practices is an evasion game between lead firms, 
suppliers, and NGOs. Lead firms are forced to retain third-
party investigators to ensure that sustainability expecta-
tions are satisfied. Suppliers shoulder evasion costs such as 
bribery and maintenance of false records in order to avoid 
detection. NGOs expend valuable resources investigating 
suppliers for violations and mobilizing other stakeholders 
to coerce sustainable change (Mena and Waeger 2014). The 
result is an inefficient outcome whereby costs are expended 
on avoidance, investigation, and sanction, rather than on 
improving social or economic welfare (Scholz 1984).
Contracts and Supply Chain Relationships
A contract is a set of mutual and enforceable promises or 
obligations to perform actions at a future time (Macneil 
1978). Contracts are not just tools for exchange, but also 
“governance mechanisms designed to minimize transaction 
costs: the costs of crafting a contract and managing a rela-
tionship and losses that accrue from opportunistic behav-
ior or lack of adaptation” (Schepker et al. 2014, p. 195). 
Contracts act as instruments of control (Ariño et al. 2014). 
They explicitly define the rights and responsibilities of par-
ties through authority mechanisms in order to minimize 
opportunistic behavior. Contracts also act as instruments 
of coordination, encouraging dialogue and information 
between parties that facilitates joint understanding of goals 
and mechanisms to attain them (Epstein 2014; Salbu 1997).
Within the supply chain management literature, numerous 
studies have so far examined how contracts can be structured 
to improve supply chain relationships and performance (e.g., 
Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Cao and Lumineau 2015; Tsay 
et al. 1999; Tsay and Lovejoy 1999). For example, Cachon 
and Lariviere (2005) explored revenue sharing contracts and 
concluded that, while such contracts can help coordinate a 
supply chain with retailers who compete based on quanti-
ties, they may offer only a small benefit when compared 
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with administratively cheaper wholesale contracts and in the 
presence of costly retail effort. Cao and Lumineau (2015) 
argued based on their meta-analytic study that contractual 
and relational governance are complementary to each other 
in producing positive joint impacts on supply chain perfor-
mance under favorable institutional environments, relation-
ship type, relationship length and contract measurement. 
Although these studies on contracts extend our understand-
ing of the influence of different types of contracts on supply 
chain performance, they focus primarily on the economic 
aspect of supply chain performance. In addition, we find 
no studies examining how precontractual investments facili-
tate sustainability in global supply chains. In the next part, 
we explain how the precontractual phase of bargaining is a 
fertile environment for signaling relationship orientations.
The Environment of Precontract
A buyer and seller are interested in exchange. After scanning 
their respective environments for possible suitors, the par-
ties perceive a potential opportunity for exchange with one 
another. The parties exchange information with one another 
in order to determine whether a deal would be value enhanc-
ing and if so under what conditions (Johnston 1999). This 
engagement that begins once bargaining commences and 
before a contract is formed is known as the precontractual 
environment. The precontractual environment is distinct 
from contractual governance, performance, and remedies 
because no agreement between the parties has yet been 
formed (Farnsworth 1987). Parties in precontractual nego-
tiations have an interest in bargaining. Each party anticipates 
outcomes that will increase their overall welfare through 
trade. The expectation of the profitable bargain incentivizes 
each negotiating party to reduce the uncertainty of the other 
sufficient to form a contract (Kostritsky 2008).
Precontractual environments offer distinct conditions 
compared to their fully formed counterparts. First, perfor-
mance norms have yet to be established. The parties do not 
have a pattern of conduct during a particular transaction 
that guide the parties in areas of ambiguity, known in con-
tract law as the course of performance (Graves 2004). For 
example, if a supplier were expected to deliver ten thousand 
garments monthly over a 24-month period, patterns of per-
formance in the first few months can generate soft habits 
of obligation that guide the parties toward the end of the 
contracted obligation. In the precontractual phase, however, 
performance of the contract has not yet commenced and such 
norms are not available to guide the parties. Parties also may 
not be able to derive expectations from the parties’ course 
of dealing, which is an experience or pattern that emerges 
over a period of time through repeated transactions (Ranere 
2008). If this is the parties’ first time contracting, there will 
be no consummated transactions upon which to base norms 
from one another. Lead firm and supplier will thus not know 
how each behaves during the performance phase of contract 
and what norms could function for the mutual benefit of both 
parties. Thus, in a precontractual environment measures of 
inferring contractual obligations in the absence of explicit 
language are weak or absent.
There may be norms established by usage in the trade, 
which is any practice that is so regularly observable in the 
industry that it justifies an expectation to be followed by the 
parties. However, it is unclear whether suppliers can reason-
ably expect to extracontractually rely on standardized trade 
practices set by distant lead firms (Gereffi and Frederick 
2010). Conversely, it is unlikely that suppliers have sufficient 
coordination to establish their own trade practices that a lead 
firm could rely upon (Rahim 2017). In the precontractual 
context, lead firm and supplier must negotiate terms and 
infer reliability without these interpretive guideposts.
Second, precise levels of bargaining power have yet to be 
fully established. As contracts are performed, lead firm can 
have greater bargaining power due to greater economic flex-
ibility (Gereffi et al. 2005). However, individual precontrac-
tual negotiations can vary bargaining power considerably. A 
supplier may be a rare specialist in a particular product or 
service, thereby increasing its bargaining power (Dedrick 
et al. 2010). Conversely, a lead firm may be so dominant 
in an industry that it can exert even greater leverage than a 
standard competitor.
Without a joint understanding of the parties’ relative con-
tractual bargaining power, the value of that contract remains 
ill-defined. It is not always the case that dominant influ-
ence in contract negotiations will necessarily produce more 
favorable agreements for the more powerful party (Barnhizer 
2005). Furthermore, disparities in bargaining power do not 
necessarily produce contracts that generate optimal value 
for both parties (Burkardt et al. 1997; Rubin and Brown 
1975). If parties misconstrue their true bargaining power, 
as is possible in the precontractual phase when relative status 
is unclear, it can generate tension and unnecessary conflict 
(Barnhizer 2005). Though extreme differences in bargaining 
power can invite abuse, a clear definition of relative status in 
non-extreme environments can bring stability to both par-
ties, and lead firm and supplier in the precontractual environ-
ment will be seeking information as to what role each party 
will play in the coming transaction.
Third, it is during the precontractual phase of bargaining 
that explicit contract terms hold their greatest power. The 
parties in precontract spend their time and energy negoti-
ating the terms of the deal. These terms will govern their 
relationship. Unless there are specific reputational effects 
that are gathered from third party interactions, no relational 
norms yet exist that subsume explicit terms (Narasimhan 
1989). Goal sharing, relationship value maximization, and 
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flexibility in signs of trouble, typical attributes in relational 
contracting that can override contract terms, have yet to 
evolve (Macneil 1978, 1987). Thus the parties, at least for 
the moment, will be expected to abide by the explicit lan-
guage of the contract. Absent a formal dispute later on, the 
parties’ joint focus on the contractual language may never 
be greater than during this initial negotiation.
Signaling in the Precontractual Environment
The environment of precontract, where inferential obliga-
tions are unknown, bargaining power is uncertain, and rela-
tional norms have yet to emerge, is a fertile environment 
for parties to signal one another. Signaling is a statement or 
action that communicates information from the sender to 
the receiver that the receiver comprehends because only a 
sender with a particular characteristic can be willing to send 
the particular signal (Posner 2000). For example, willingly 
concluding a deal with a handshake signals both trust and 
economic power, as only a person who does not expect trou-
ble and can afford to function without a formal agreement 
could do so. The harder it is to observe and verify facts about 
another party, the more important signals become (Moore 
2003).
Lead firms can deploy precontractual signals to encour-
age sustainability conditions in their supply chains. The first 
and most obvious signal type is a direct investment into the 
emerging precontractual relation. For example, a supplier 
invests in lead firm-specific equipment even before the con-
tract is signed with the lead firm. A lead firm can agree to 
negotiate exclusively with a supplier in good faith for a set 
period of time. A lead firm can expose the supplier to fair 
workplace practices by enabling collaboration between the 
supplier and an NGO. A clothing manufacturer can hire and 
train quality control personnel to serve a specific retailer 
and her specific demands prior to a written contract (Beer 
et al. 2017).
The advantage of relation-specific investments is that the 
signal is generally unequivocal. Expending resources on 
relation-specific investments signals to the recipient that the 
investor is interested in long-term future returns (Crawford 
1990). Generally, only the entities that are willing to make 
such investments are ones that anticipate enough long-term 
payoffs to recover their costs (Posner 2000). A deceptive or 
short-term oriented party would be unwilling to make such 
investments because they could result in a loss for the short-
term minded party and make exploitation unprofitable. The 
limitation, however, is that such investments can be costly. 
Firms operate on thin margins (Sridhar and Prashad 2006), 
and thus there may be little room for initial investments. 
If a firm voluntarily narrows that margin further through a 
precontractual investment, the firm has to be confident that 
it can recoup the loss in the future.
The second precontractual signal is the offer of repeated 
exchange, which has been found to be valuable in prior stud-
ies of supplier–buyer relationships (Elfenbein and Zenger 
2014, 2017). A repeated exchange is an offer made by the 
lead firm to the supplier to commit to multiple transactions 
of goods for contractually agreed period of time. When the 
period of time ends, the parties are free to renew their part-
nership or seek other buyers and sellers elsewhere.
An offer of repeated exchange is valuable to all parties, 
but especially so to suppliers at the base of the supply chain. 
One of the most important needs of a supplier is financial 
and operational stability. Suppliers at the base of the sup-
ply chain experience thin margins, inflexible demands, and 
unforgiving deadlines (Soundararajan and Brown 2016). 
Suppliers receive orders on an ad hoc basis and their sur-
vival depends on meeting time-pressured demands of lead 
firms. Once contracts are completed, further work can be 
discontinued without warning or reason. Survival for a sup-
plier, particularly a small supplier in a competitive industry, 
is thus subject to volatility arising from economic forces out-
side its control (Choi and Hong 2002). An offer of repeated 
exchange by a lead firm grants needed stability to a sup-
plier who can count on the commitment of multiple transac-
tions. This increases the value of the bargain to the supplier, 
who may in turn be more willing to invest in the emerging 
relationship.
The final and perhaps most subtle precontractual signal 
between negotiating parties is known as cheap talk. Cheap 
talk is a message from one party to another party that does 
not impact either party’s payoff from the forthcoming trans-
action (Johnston 1999; Farrell 1987). Although dismissively 
named, cheap talk is not valueless. Cheap talk has been 
shown in a variety of experimental contexts to influence 
human behavior (Dugar and Shahriar 2018; Anbarci et al. 
2017; Crawford and Sobel 1982). Cheap talk can commu-
nicate expressions of optimism about the eventual outcome 
of the negotiations (Cooter 2000). Cheap talk can also com-
municate the confidence that an enduring partnership will 
be a profitable one.
Cheap talk in precontractual environments can be both 
informative and credible (Johnston 1999). Such talk enables 
the parties to test the counterparty’s willingness to negotiate 
further, and can build cooperation in negotiation (Kostritsky 
2008; Johnston 1999). Cheap talk also helps filter out parties 
who are incompatible and would be unwilling to invest in 
cheap talk exchange and by extension an emerging relation-
ship. In addition to expressions of optimism and confidence, 
cheap talk can also appear as statements about mutual back-
grounds and interests, exchange of gifts, socialization, or 
suggestions of possible areas of flexibility in negotiations 
(Shell 1991).
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The advantage of cheap talk is that it is low cost. State-
ments of confidence and optimism, exchange of gifts, and 
related actions are sufficiently low cost that they would not 
materially impact the profitability of the emerging transac-
tion (Johnston 1999; Farrell 1987). The limitation of cheap 
talk is that it might not always work. Parties may have lack 
a socio-cognitive common ground, language barriers may 
deter communication, and geographic distance may inhibit 
that discourages face-to-face exchanges (Abdi and Aulakh 
2017; Soundararajan et al. 2017). This can be managed, 
however, by deliberate engagement with the other party 
and the use of intermediaries to translate messages through 
socio-cognitive lenses.
Framing of Signals in Precontract 
Encourages Mutual Engagement
While signals are influential tools to communicate com-
mitment in precontract, they become even more influential 
when leveraged by framing. Framing is the organization and 
presentation of information, actions, choices or events that 
emphasize a current or desired state of existence (Giorgi and 
Weber 2015). Framing generates a perception of outcomes 
and contingencies associated with a particular risk-based 
choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In precontract, the 
lead firm can emphasize the positive gains of an interde-
pendent relationship, such as the opportunity for supplier 
growth, consistent returns over time, and an enhanced abil-
ity to anticipate future market demands. This gain-focused 
framing influences the supplier to trust by raising expected 
utility of the transaction (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
Framing can also influence non-risk-based factors. Attrib-
ute framing is a mechanism that impacts interpretation of a 
specific characteristic (Levin et al. 1998).3 Framing attrib-
utes of the relationship positively can encourage engage-
ment in the emerging relation. Contract attributes such as 
an incentive for prompt delivery of product can be framed 
as an on-time reward rather than a late penalty. Rates of 
long-term engagement by suppliers with the lead firm can 
be described as 75% success rate rather than a 25% failure 
rate (Teigen and Karevold 2005; Levin and Gaeth 1988). 
When events are framed in this fashion, individuals are more 
likely to view the attribute positively than in absence of the 
frame (Krishnamurthy et al. 2001; Marteau 1989; Wilson 
et al. 1987).
Recent research shows promising results for the role 
of framing on fostering sustainable global supply chains. 
For example, Soundararajan and Brammer (2018) studied 
how sub-suppliers respond to sustainability requirements 
in South India’s garment industry. The authors found that 
framing of sustainability requirements played an important 
role in influencing sub-supplier perceptions of procedural 
fairness. These perceptions of procedural fairness in turn 
influenced their propensity to engage in reciprocal behaviors 
toward sustainability.
Framing is distinctive from other trust-building mecha-
nisms because it is more effective during precontract than 
other contract phases. First, framing is more influential when 
credible information about the counterparty is limited or 
absent (Druckman 2001a, b). In precontract, and unlike other 
contract stages, neither party has the hindsight of experience 
working with the counterparty. This is particularly true for 
suppliers that communicate with lead firms only infrequently 
or indirectly. Their awareness of the other party is limited.
Second, framing is more influential when a party lacks 
the opportunity for careful evaluation and reflection (Hodg-
kinson et al. 1999; Tetlock 1992). Suppliers in precontract 
are driven by demands to respond to contract proposals at 
once, and contract demands are becoming increasingly time-
sensitive due to the increased pace imposed by lead firms 
and global competition (Wilhelm et al. 2016). In the fast 
fashion industry, for example, increasing consumer demands 
for novelty has created as many as twenty fashion seasons 
per year. This forces suppliers to respond immediately to 
contractual demands and fulfill orders without delay. If a 
supplier hesitates, buyers will simply go elsewhere (Barnes 
and Lee-Greenwood 2006). Such an environment discour-
ages suppliers from careful reflection, and thus framing takes 
over to enable cognitive shortcuts to reach a decision.4 As 
a result, framing drives a decision more strongly than when 
opportunity for reflection is more readily available.
Finally, precontractual framing can leverage prospect 
theory. Prospect theory posits that individuals make deci-
sions that deviate from expected utility in consistent and 
predictable ways (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and Taversky 
1979). Prospect theory predicts that individuals will select 
risk-adverse decisions when choosing between options that 
appear to be gains. Conversely, individuals will are more 
likely to make risk-seeking decision in the face of choices 
between losses. (Guthrie 2003). Parties can leverage this 
deviation from expected utility by framing the precontrac-
tual decision to contract as a choice between benefits. This 
3 The classic study of attribute framing was conducted by Levin and 
Gaeth (1988), who showed that a sample of ground beef was per-
ceived as better quality when it was labeled as “75% lean” than when 
it was labeled “25% fat.”
4 This effect is similar to fast and intuitive approached termed by 
Daniel Kahneman as “System 1” thinking, which contrasts the careful 
and deliberate “System 2” reflection method of processing informa-
tion (Kahneman 2011).
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leverages prospect theory to nudge the decision to contract 
toward risk-aversion and thus invest relationally even when 
expected utility might predict otherwise.
Generation of Relational Rent 
and Investments in Sustainable Practices
Precontractual signals arising from framing effects encour-
age the parties to work together with an orientation toward 
the long-term (Beer et al. 2017; Frenkel 2001). This in turn 
generates a relational rent, a supernormal profit that is the 
result of parties pooling idiosyncratic resources, capabili-
ties, knowledge, and governance mechanisms (Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Eunni 2009; Handfield and Bechtel 2002). 
Such rents take place when the expected value of inflows 
of investment and knowledge exceed expected losses due 
to competitors and knowledge spillovers (Cousins et al. 
2006). They typically arise when parties engage in knowl-
edge exchange, logistics responsiveness, and use of common 
resources (Frohlich and Westbrook 2001). Relational rents 
cannot accrue individually and are only available through 
alliances with partners (Lavie 2006). Relational rents are 
created through dedicated resource allocation and invest-
ments to coordinate relationships. These rents result in an 
increase of the performance of these relations over time 
(Kale et al. 2002). As noted earlier, both lead firm and sup-
plier benefit from these rents through decreased monitoring 
costs, increased efficiency-enhancing practices, and relation-
specific investments of labor and capital.
A firm benefitting from relational rent could choose to 
allocate that rent toward non-sustainable practices such as 
lowering prices. However, significant incentives exist for 
both parties to invest relational rent in sustainable practices. 
Sustainable policies and practices capture market value, 
encourage innovation, and promote new business platforms 
(Nidumolu et  al. 2009). Sustainable practices can also 
improve risk management, foster innovation, improve finan-
cial performance, better engage customers, and motivate 
employees (Whelan and Fink 2016; Rao and Holt 2005).
Sustainability also helps suppliers through reduced local 
NGO resistance, increased productivity, and reduced turno-
ver as a result of engagement in sustainable practices (Huq 
et al. 2016). Consequently, this reduces their overall opera-
tional cost (Wilhelm et al. 2016). In a price-sensitive setting 
like global supply chains, reducing operational cost without 
damaging the environment and exploiting labor is a unique 
selling point that would attract the attention of sustainabil-
ity-focused lead firms.
If all firms could easily adopt sustainable supply chains, 
the benefits would be absorbed and cleared by market 
forces. Sustainable practices in supply chains, however, 
are not easy to imitate. Sustainability takes time, trust, 
and coordination to achieve, and firms in supply chains 
can lack the culture, vision, or incentive to move success-
fully toward sustainable goals (Laughland and Bansal 
2011). Firms already benefitting from relationships built 
on framed precontractual signals have already overcome 
many of these barriers. While the benefits of sustainabil-
ity remain the same, the cost of achieving sustainability 
remains lower than firms dealing in the spot market. This 
encourages firms in trusting relations to pivot toward sus-
tainable practices and overcome organizational frictions 
faster than competitors (Harbison 1956).
Incentives toward sustainable practices also emerge from 
the relationship. Both the lead firm and the supplier operate 
with thicker margins because of relational rent. The rela-
tional rent alleviates the financial pressure of avoiding genu-
ine sustainability practices due to financial exigency. In addi-
tion, in spot market environments, a lead firm could avoid 
responsibility for unsustainable supply chain practices by 
denying responsibility for its suppliers or simply switching 
suppliers when external monitors apply pressure (Lerbinger 
2014). Moral disengagement costs are low in spot markets 
because the lead firm holds no affiliation with the supplier 
and switching costs are negligible (Eriksson and Svensson 
2016). However, when a lead firm has a long-term relational 
partnership with a supplier, denial of moral responsibility 
is unrealistic and decoupling costs are high. Switching sup-
pliers would mean the loss of relation-specific investments, 
frame resonance and the relational rent.
There are also supplier-specific incentives to engage in 
sustainable practices. The supplier is aware that the lead 
firm’s monitoring costs are low as a result of the relational 
partnership, increasing the risk of detection (Huq et al. 
2016). In addition to the increased risk of detection, the 
supplier also has more to lose if inauthentic practices are 
uncovered. If the lead firm exits due to sustainability prob-
lems, it could trigger increased financial volatility, layoffs, 
and the loss of cultivated trust and relation-specific invest-
ments. A supplier accustomed to steady orders from a single 
lead firm in which it has made relation-specific investments 
may no longer be as nimble as its spot-market counterparts if 
involuntarily separated (Lazzarini et al. 2008). The increased 
risks and costs result in suppliers having a greater incentive 
to take sustainability practices seriously when expected from 
the lead firm. For example, global furniture seller IKEA 
manages their suppliers with these incentives in mind. IKEA 
executives adopt a partnership model rather than an adver-
sarial model towards their suppliers. Through this model, 
IKEA works with suppliers to identify potential business 
improvements and correct them cooperatively. Suppliers 
reciprocate from this treatment by more readily meeting 
their production requirements, including their engagement 
in sustainability practices (Ivarsson and Alvstam 2010).
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External monitoring incentives also change the lead firm 
and supplier relationship. External monitors or auditors 
remain important influences for promoting sustainable sup-
ply chains (Huq et al. 2016; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Mena 
and Waeger 2014). They will be aware of the firm-specific 
investments and other costly commitments that bind the sup-
plier and lead firm. Those ties that bind, in turn, will enable 
monitors to target more effective and concentrated pres-
sure on stable relationships rather than having to continu-
ally uncover the nature of partnerships between lead firms 
and shifting suppliers. In addition, monitors will generate a 
greater return on their resource investments by pressuring for 
sustainable change in relationships that will likely continue 
to endure rather than remain transient in the spot market. 
Lead firms who claim ignorance of supplier practices will 
be put to task given their steady and profitable engagement 
with the same suppliers.
The stability of lead firm and supplier relations also 
encourages the development of partnerships between the 
lead firm and external monitors. Monitors do not only have 
the ability to investigate and encourage sanctions, they often 
possess substantial expertise on the implementation and uti-
lization of the practices for which they advocate (Teegen 
et al. 2004). Monitors can share this expertise with lead 
firms and suppliers in order to lower their cost of adopting 
sustainable practices. This can evolve into a relationship of 
its own, whereby monitors partner more closely with lead 
firms to promote a variety of mutually beneficial business 
competencies such as legitimacy with customers, access to 
local expertise, and development of new markets (Dahan 
et al. 2010). Firms will thus be motivated both through 
encouraging rewards and discouraging sanctions to engage 
in sustainable investments.
Given the rapidly evolving nature of sustainable practices, 
no lead-firm and supplier relationship will be perfect. Even 
firms with long-term, trustful and resonant relations will 
continue to experience difficulties with sustainability com-
pliance. In any contractual exchange that lasts for a period of 
time, trouble between the parties is expected as a matter of 
course (Macneil 1987). Whereas in the precontractual con-
text the parties build relations through investments, offers 
and communication, as the partnership solidifies precontrac-
tual signals between contracts evolve to serve as a check to 
preserve the partnership over time.5 Parties can mismanage 
contract performance, misinterpret intentions, or experience 
external social or economic shocks that destabilize their faith 
in the association. Instead of embedding norms during pre-
contractual bargaining, investments now signal continuing 
commitment in between contracts when a partnership is 
threatened (Jap and Ganesan 2000). A temporary relaxa-
tion of contractual terms, sharing of production expertise, 
or a reaffirmation of commitments resting on a bedrock of 
precontractually cultivated trust can help fractured relation-
ships get back on track.
Boundary Conditions
Although precontractual signals, when framed appropriately, 
can facilitate profitable and sustainable relations, their abil-
ity to do so is not unlimited. Supply chains typically contain 
some risk, and a certain level of risk is required in order for 
the precontractual signals to work because risk is necessary 
for social exchanges to occur (Molm et al. 2000). If an asso-
ciation presents too little risk to the parties, there is no vol-
untary restraint from exploitation upon which mutual trust, 
and thus relational elements, can develop (Serva et al. 2005; 
Rousseau et al. 1998). Conversely, too much risk can prevent 
relationships from forming at all. Bargaining under high risk 
can encourage patterns of mutual resistance, suspicion, and 
hostility that derail a potentially valuable association (Boyle 
and Lawler 1991). When risk is excessive, precontractual 
signals may be rejected as insufficient displays of relation-
ship development or exploited as signs of weakness. Thus, 
a level of risk that is neither non-existent nor extreme is 
necessary for precontractual signals to function.
In addition, even though precontractual signals are mar-
ket-driven and rely on self-interest, an external incentive 
may be necessary to initiate the sustainability-generating 
mechanism in supply chain partnerships. For example, firm 
leadership may have the vision to pursue the superior value 
that exists when companies pursue long-term supplier rela-
tions in their supply chain (Prajogo and Olhager 2012). This 
in turn will encourage the relational climate that advances 
sustainable policies. External monitors can place sufficient 
pressure on firms that they eschew ‘window dressing’ in 
favor of wanting genuine sustainable investments. In some 
cases, a tragedy such as the Rana Plaza disaster can motivate 
even firms uninvolved in the event to invest in sustainable 
practices as a safeguard (Jacobs and Singhal 2017). Finally, 
firm leaders may display a moral motivation to act (de Colle 
and Werhane 2008), based upon an altruistic commitment 
to fairness, social justice and worker well-being. These 
triggers, whether by altruism, incentive, or coercion, enable 
precontractual investments to promote sustainable practices 
through profitable exchange.
5 As the partnership has progressed beyond initial bargaining and 
exchange, investments at this time could more accurately be called 
intercontractual investments. At the end of a contract, the parties 
reassess their relationship before negotiating a new contract. Inter-
contractual investments are signals and actions taken in between the 
performance of completed and anticipated contracts. For purposes of 
this manuscript, intercontractual investments play a similar role as 
precontractual signals, though further research may unearth intrigu-
ing differences between the two contexts.
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Third, our arguments suggest the existence of a relational 
rent in order to motivate the investment in sustainability ini-
tiatives. In spite of the literature that theorizes the condi-
tions under which relational rent may be created (Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Handfield and Bechtel 2002), there may be situ-
ations where a shared surplus may not materialize. Capital 
and human investments may either be unavailable or be so 
homogeneous as to be not firm-specific. Relation-specific 
investments may not produce a return that exceeds the short 
run opportunity cost or returns from the second best use 
of the resource (Dyer and Singh 1998). The spot market 
may already be so efficient that relation-building adds little 
value. Cultural, temporal, linguistic, or intermediation bar-
riers may be so strong that a shared surplus cannot take root. 
Relational commitments may turn myopic, leading parties to 
miss new opportunities and stagnate (Grayson and Ambler 
1999; Zahra et al. 2006). Firms can also squander relational 
rent through myopia, mismanagement, or stagnation and 
thus deter sustainable initiatives.
Fourth, scholars across disciplines agree that “frames 
are effective at influencing an intended listener or audience 
when they resonate, i.e., match or align with the audience’s 
beliefs, values, aspirations, or ideas” (Giorgi 2017: p. 712; 
Carter 2013; Benford and Snow 2000). Some frames may be 
non-resonant with the recipient, such frames that are cultur-
ally sensitive to time and context (McDonnell et al. 2017). 
Therefore, in order for the lead firm’s framing of a precon-
tractual signal to make an optimal impact, the frame must 
sufficiently resonate with the supplier to provoke a response 
or an action.
Finally, the success of the precontractual signals depends 
on the existence of absorptive capacity in lead firms and 
suppliers. Absorptive capacity is the ability to assimilate and 
apply valuable external knowledge (Zahra and George 2002) 
of lead firms and suppliers. Both lead firms and suppliers 
must be capable enough to absorb and utilize the knowledge 
transferred between them. Research suggests that absorp-
tive capacity is influenced by various factors including past 
experience, knowledge source and complementarity (Zahra 
and George 2002). Efforts directed at reducing information 
frictions, for example, may be obstructed by differing per-
ceptions of knowledge absorptive capacity among lead firms 
and suppliers. For the precontractual signals to work, both 
lead firms and suppliers must be able to process knowledge 
in order for relationship development to occur.
Discussion
Research suggests that the impact of existing measures to 
improve sustainability in global supply chains is limited 
(Locke et.al. 2009; Soundararajan and Brammer 2018). As 
sustainability expectations are often a part of contracts, and 
that the complexities of global supply chains impede con-
tractual performance, poor implementation of the sustain-
able practices becomes a significant risk. By drawing on 
insights from the literature on contracts (Bebchuk and Ben-
Shahar 2001; Kostritsky 1998), we explain how transaction-
specific material and non-material signals during precontrac-
tual bargaining, when framed appropriately, can facilitate 
contractual performance of sustainability obligations.
Our article offers multiple contributions to the literature. 
First, we contribute to the growing research on sustainable 
global supply chains (Huq et al. 2016; Levy et al. 2015). 
While significant research has addressed contracts in sup-
ply chain management (Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Cao 
and Lumineau 2015), we know little about the influence of 
precontractual signals on sustainable practices in global sup-
ply chains. The influence of framing precontractual signals, 
including relation-specific investments, offers of repeated 
exchange and cheap talk, offers a promising line of research 
into precontractual behavior in supply chains.
Second, we add to the literature on supply chain govern-
ance (Bartley 2011; Detomasi 2007; Nadvi 2008; Parmigiani 
and Rivera-Santos 2015; Scherer et al. 2006) by opening up 
a new line of inquiry into governance mechanisms that blend 
together market forces, self-interest, and precontractual con-
duct. The literature on governance in global supply chains is 
divided. One strand focuses more on economic competitive-
ness (e.g., Gereffi et al. 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002) 
and the other strand emphasizes more on social and/or envi-
ronmental sustainability (e.g., Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 
2014; Soundararajan and Brown 2016). By highlighting the 
precontractual process through which these two strands can 
be combined and relationship can be improved between lead 
firms and suppliers, we add to the emerging literature on 
governance for sustainable global supply chains.
Third, our research advances the application of framing 
into a novel contractual context. The concept of framing 
has been used extensively in social sciences to understand 
a wide range of topics, including collective action (Benford 
and Snow 2000), political communication (Scheufele 1999) 
and investment decisions (Giorgi and Weber 2015). Nev-
ertheless, the concept is significantly underutilized within 
the sustainable supply chain literature (Soundararajan and 
Brammer 2018). By highlighting the role of framing as a 
channel through which precontractual signals can be effec-
tively transmitted, we suggest the power of framing in con-
tract performance in complex contexts like global supply 
chains.
Fourth, the extant research on sustainable global supply 
chains offers limited insights about the micro-level behav-
ioral processes that are involved in the sustainability-related 
exchanges between lead firms and suppliers (Soundararajan 
and Brammer 2018). By emphasizing the importance of 
embedding interactional and communicative processes in 
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the precontractual signaling process, we contribute to the 
emerging literature on the micro-processes of sustainable 
global supply chains.
Finally, our work advances understanding on interplay 
between formal contracts and relational governance. There 
is a split in the literature, with some finding that contracts 
reduce relational motivations and behavior (e.g., Malhotra 
and Murnighan 2002) and others concluding that contracts 
facilitate trust-building and initial cooperation between con-
tracting parties (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002; Gulati and 
Nickerson 2008). Our work supports the latter view and 
highlights how formal contracting and relational governance 
are not substitutes in supply chains, but value-generating 
compliments. We suggest that formal contracts and their 
precontractual negotiation are necessary bases from which 
relational governance can emerge. Also, formal contracts 
remain a backstop of protection when relational governance 
is challenged through misinterpretation of terms or non-per-
formance. Contract terms prevent devolution of problems 
into mistrust and enhance likelihood of repair (Lumineau 
and Henderson 2012).
Future Research Directions
Our paper is one of the first to explore the role of precon-
tractual signals in building sustainable global supply chains, 
there are avenues for future research. First, we focused on a 
few types of precontractual signals, namely relation-specific 
investments, offers of repeated exchange and cheap talk. 
Future research can unveil other types of precontractual 
signals and their influence on negotiations and subsequent 
impact on performance and sustainable practices. Second, 
given that precontractual negotiations play an important 
role in the sustainability performance of the supply chains 
actors, future research is needed to explore how precontrac-
tual negotiations occur, and the factors that shape such nego-
tiations (Beer et al. 2017). Third, more research is needed 
on violations of contracts within global supply chains. We 
do not know enough about how and why suppliers violate 
contracts, and how lead firms respond to contract violations. 
Fourth, while we highlighted the importance of framing 
precontractual signals to avoid signal distortion, we did not 
explore the influence of different types of framing. Future 
research can explore the effects different framing of pre-
contractual signals can have on relationships and sustain-
ability performance. Fifth, future research can also explore 
the conditions under which framing resonance of precon-
tractual signals can occur. Sixth, more work can be done on 
the impact of prospect theory and framing on developing 
sustainable relations, particularly in varying informational, 
cultural, and economic conditions. Finally, some supply 
chains are heavily reliant on intermediaries who provide data 
about suppliers, facilitate economies of scale, ensure quality 
assurance and tailor relationships to specific customer needs 
(Boyle et al. 2008). Further work can explore the positive or 
negative influence of intermediaries on the precontractual 
negotiations related to sustainability, and development and 
maintenance of contractual relationship between suppliers 
and lead firms.
Conclusion
As the conventional tools to implement sustainability in 
global supply chains, including standards, conventions and 
regulations have not produced the intended outcomes; it 
is becoming apparent that research and practice ought to 
explore novel tools. While other work examines contract 
performance and breach, we direct our attention to the pre-
contractual stage, which lays the foundation for the contrac-
tual performance of a lead-firm-supplier relationship. We 
suggest that when signals like relation-specific investments, 
offers of repeated exchange, and cheap talk are used dur-
ing the precontractual stage, they can leverage the benefits 
framing not fully available in other contractual stages. As 
a result of the relation-specific investments and offers of 
repeated exchange, a surplus in the form of relational rent 
can be generated. This rent can then be used to implement 
and improve sustainable supply chain practices. By empha-
sizing the importance of precontractual investments as a 
mechanism to enable sustainable global supply chains, we 
show how precontractual forces can encourage sustainable 
practices. Precontractual investments can in fact comple-
ment other mechanisms under certain conditions and are a 
promising avenue for further scholarship.
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